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Abstract:  
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005) between the government of Sudan and the SPLM 
led to a referendum on self-determination for the people of southern Sudan. The result of the 
referendum held in January 2011 showed an overwhelming majority for an independent South 
Sudan. President al-Bashir attended the celebration and promised full cooperation with the new 
state. However, many issues were not settled during the six years Interim Period, they had to be 
negotiated later. Since July 2010, the two parties failed to reach an agreement on the major 
outstanding issues: oil transportation fees, Abyei dispute, border line between the two countries, 
and security arrangements. Few clashes occurred between the two armies which led to the 
intervention of the African Union and the UN Security Council; both august bodies passed 
similar resolutions on the conflict demanding immediate cessation of hostilities, withdrawal from 
disputed areas and reaching agreements on all outstanding issues within three months under the 
facilitation of African Union High Implementation Panel headed by Thabo Mbeki of South 
Africa. Two rounds of negotiation took place in May and June 2012 in Addis Ababa without 
tangible success. The SC warned the party which obstructs a negotiated solution with appropriate 
measures under Chapter 41. 
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Introduction 
The civil war between the North and South in the Sudan, which started in 
August 1955 before the independence of the country, was the longest in the 
history of Africa. The reasons behind the war are complex; they link with a 
combination of both external and internal factors. The closed district policy 
of the British administration in the Sudan laid the foundation of separating 
the two regions for three decades; the missionary propaganda inflamed the 
feelings of the Southerners against the Muslim Arabs of the North; the long 
military rule in Khartoum adopted the course of military solution to the 
southern problem; and the weak democratic governments did not have the 
time or the political will to give the South an acceptable federal system. 
General al-Bashir, like Numeiri before him, was compelled to accept a 
political solution with the Sudan People‟s Liberation Movement/Sudan 
People‟s Liberation Army (SPLM/A) based on a semi-independent 
federalism and right for self-determination. The Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) reached between the two parties, the National Congress 
Party (NCP) and the SPLM/A), in January 2005 under the auspices of the 
Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), was a result of long 
negotiations that dragged on for more than three years in Kenya. The 
outstanding issues came to the political arena in Sudan as a result of 
Southern Sudan referendum and its consequence, the birth of the Republic of 
South Sudan. 
The CPA 
The detailed Agreement is divided into six chapters: Machakos Protocol, 
Power Sharing, Wealth Sharing, Abyei Conflict, Southern Kordofan & Blue Nile, and 
Security Arrangements. The Machakos Protocol, which was signed in July 
2002, set the following basic principles: self-determination to the people of 
South Sudan through a referendum, right of legislations based on Sharia for 
the North, the border of North-South is that of January 1956 as incorporated 
in the Declaration of Principles adopted by the IGAD, and an interim period 
of six years before the referendum. The Power Sharing gave the South a 
semi-independent rule; the allocation of seats in the national assembly 
before the elections was divided as follows: 52% of the seats to the NCP, 
28% to the SPLM, 14% to other northern parties, 6% to other southern 
parties. In the national executive the incumbent president shall continue 
while the chairman of the SPLM becomes the first vice-president. The 
offices of the national executive will be divided in the same ratio as that of 
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the national assembly. In the legislature of Southern Sudan, the SPLM shall 
be represented by 70%, the NCP by 15% and other southern political forces 
by 15%; the executive in the South shall be divided in the same way as that 
of the legislature. The state legislatures (15 in the North and 10 in the South) 
shall be comprised as follows: the NCP is to hold 70% in the northern states 
and 10% in the South, the SPLM will take 70% in the southern states and 
10% in the North, the other political forces in the North and South shall 
divide the remaining 20% among themselves. The state executive in the 
North and in the South shall be divided among the political parties in the 
same way as the state legislature. 
However, the arrangement for Abyei, South Kordofan and Blue Nile is 
different; for Abyei its executive council is shared by the two parties to the 
CPA and appointed by the presidency, which is comprised of the president 
and his two deputies. In the case of South Kordofan and Blue Nile, the 
legislature and the executive is divided only between the two partners, 55% 
for NCP and 45% for SPLM. The three regions were given some form of 
self-autonomy and promised financial assistance enabling them to 
reconstruct their damaged infrastructure, as war affected zones. A special 
commission is established to define the boundaries of the disputed Abyei, 
which was transferred by the British administration to Kordofan in 1905; it 
is called “Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC)”. Another commission is to 
be formed by the presidency to conduct a referendum among the residents of 
Abyei to decide whether they want to retain their special status in the North 
or be part of Bahr el Ghazal in the South. The two other northern states were 
granted the right for “popular consultation” to give their opinions, through 
the elected legislative assemblies, on their status as agreed in the CPA and 
how it is implemented in the interim period. 
The wealth sharing is as follows: 
1. The net oil revenue extracted from wells in Southern Sudan (75% of 
Sudan oil is located in Southern Sudan) shall be divided equally between 
the government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) and the national government 
(50% to each), after giving out 2% to the region in which the oil is 
produced. 
2. The national government, the government in the South and state 
governments are entitled to legislate, raise and collect taxes as listed in 
the CPA. 
The security arrangements allowed the two armies, Sudan Armed Forces 
(SAF) and SPLA, to continue as separate forces, the first will be deployed 
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in the North and the second in the South. That was a big concession to the 
SPLM, which allowed it later to go smoothly for secession. A Joint 
Integrated Units (39000 soldiers) will be formed from SAF and SPLA and 
be stationed in the South, Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile and Khartoum. A 
Joint Defense Board (JDB) under the supervision of the presidency shall 
command the integrated units. The provisions and principles governing the 
ceasefire, disengagement and redeployment are written in meticulous 
details. 
The international community hailed the agreement as a model of peaceful 
resolution to the longest conflict in Africa; the signing ceremony was 
witnessed and signed by the presidents of Kenya and Uganda, and senior 
representatives from Egypt, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, United Kingdom, 
United States of America, African Union, European Union, IGAD partners, 
Arab League and United Nations. It was an impressive occasion that took 
place in the national stadium of Nairobi on the 9
th
 of January, 2005. 
Implementation of the CPA 
The real challenge to the CPA was its implementation in a serious and 
honest way that maintains the spirit of cooperation, which marked the long 
negotiating process that led to the conclusion of the agreement. The 
challenge proved to be difficult and sensitive because of the following 
obstacles: the lack of trust between the two partners, especially after the 
sudden demise of John Garang de Mabior, the chairman of SPLM/A; the 
economic difficulties which faced the government of Sudan after the loss of 
half of the oil revenue coming from the South; in addition to the failure of 
the international community to fulfill its financial promises to the 
government. The American sanctions against the North put more pressure on 
the economy; the support given by each government to opposition groups 
against the other eroded the trust between the two partners. The limited 
clashes between the armies of both governments in Abyei and Malakal, 
showed a growing hostility between the two parties which incited small 
extreme groups within both governments to advocate confrontation. The relationship 
between the two partners during the interim period was mostly tense, 
suspicious and quarrelsome. The issues of Abyei boundary, its referendum 
commission, the delimitation of border between North and South, the 
population census, the actual oil revenue, the referendum laws for the South 
and Abyei, etc. were all questions of disagreement and dispute between the 
NCP and the SPLM, which under frustration withdrew for some months 
from the Government of National Unity (GoNU) and the parliament. As a 
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matter of fact, the SPLM acted during the interim period as an opposition 
party to the NCP rather than a partner, allying itself most of the time with 
the opposition parties in the North. However, the major steps in the CPA 
were completed although later than envisioned in the agreement: the power 
sharing in the federal and regional governments, the withdrawal of SAF 
from the South, a partial withdrawal of SPLA from the North, the equal 
sharing of the southern oil revenue, the passing of the referendum laws, the mid-
term election and the implementation of the referendum on self-
determination for the South and the acceptance of its harsh secession 
outcome. However, some important issues which should have been dealt 
with during the interim period were not settled; they were shifted to after the 
referendum. The postponement of settling important issues like Abyei, oil, 
the North-South border and nationality, caused many problems to individual 
citizens in the other state, pastoralists, cross-border traders and economic 
difficulties to both governments which threaten peace and security in the 
country. The GoSS insisted on having the referendum of the South on time 
at any cost; the western powers supported that position and put much 
pressure on Khartoum to accept the demand irrespective of its serious 
consequences. The crisis between the two parties at present is a logical 
outcome of the hurried way the implementation of the CPA was completed. 
A strong criticism is directed by many political observers and analysts to the 
CPA, that it was a convenient settlement between two armed groups who 
were fed up with fighting; those who hoped for real change in the 
governance of the whole country were disappointed. Many sympathizers and 
supporters of the SPLM in the North were frustrated that the liberation 
movement, which called for a „new Sudan‟ and promised to work for the 
unity of the country, easily opted for secession. The SPLM leadership did 
not show much interest in the affairs of the North nor in the system of good 
governance. The First Vice-President, Salva Kiir Mayardit, was absent from 
his office in the Republican Palace in Khartoum most of the time. The 
objectives of „democratic transformation‟, „the bill of rights‟, the freedom of 
expression and association, all enshrined in the CPA and in the transitional 
constitution were not respected by either government in its domain. The 
whole exercise of the CPA looked like a division of power between the two 
armed groups; the NCP continued its grip on the North while the SPLM took 
its share of power in the South. 
Nevertheless, the CPA brought a long-awaited peace in the country and had 
in its first few years many defenders. The Assessment and Evaluation 
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Commission (AEC), established by the CPA to monitor the implementation, 
said in its final report: “It has been a unique experiment in peace-building, of 
unprecedented scale and complexity. Some of the outcomes could not have 
been clearly foreseen when the Agreement was drafted. Lessons can and 
should be learnt from the problems that arose. But the overall achievement 
of the CPA as described in this and earlier AEC reports remain something 
that Sudanese, north and south, can view with pride – not least the act of 
self-determination, promptly accepted by all, which has brought a new 
member into the community of nations.” Although the government of Sudan 
was disappointed at the outcome of the referendum; President al-Bashir 
attended the celebration ceremony of the independence of the Republic of 
South Sudan on the 9
th
 of July 2011in Juba and addressed the crowd saying 
that the will of the people of the South has to be respected and he promised 
full cooperation with the new state. 
The Outstanding Issues 
The Southern Sudan Referendum Act 2009, passed by the National 
Assembly on 31
st
 December 2009, stated under article (67) some substantive 
issues that would be negotiated by the two parties to the CPA, and witnessed 
by the organizations and countries signatories to the CPA. They were left over 
from the interim period, during which they should have been negotiated and 
settled. It is possible that the GoSS wanted to discuss these issues as an 
independent country instead of a junior partner to the hawkish Inqaz regime. 
The issues are the following: 
a) Nationality; 
b) Currency; 
c) Public service; 
d) Position of the  Joint Integrated Units, national security and 
intelligence; 
e) International agreements and covenants;  
f) Assets and debts; 
g) Oil fields, production, transport and export of oil;  
h) Contracts and environment in oil fields; 
i) Water; 
j) Property; 
k) Any other issues to be agreed upon by the two parties. 
There are other issues which are part of the CPA but were not settled before 
the secession and thus have to be negotiated later: Abyei question, the 
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North-South border, security arrangements, and popular consultation in the Blue 
Nile and Southern Kordofan states. 
The first meeting between the two parties (NCP & SPLM) to discuss the 
outstanding issues took place in Mekelle of Ethiopia from 21
st
 to 22
nd
 June 
2010. It was a successful meeting; the two parties signed a MoU containing 
the following points: that the negotiations will be conducted by a joint team 
of six members from each party. The African Union High Implementation 
Panel (AUHIP) chaired by Thabo Mbeki shall be the facilitator, supported 
by IGAD, the UN and IGAD partners. The negotiations shall be supported 
by a full time joint technical secretariat of six members that coordinate and 
liaise with AEC, which will provide administrative support. The parties 
agreed to cluster the negotiations into four working groups to address the 
issues as follows: citizenship; security; financial, economic and natural 
resources; international treaties and legal issues. The substantive 
negotiations on these issues should commence on 19
th
 July in Juba. It was a 
promising start for a difficult and complex job.  
Another important meeting was convened later, in November 2010 by 
AUHIP in Khartoum, for the two parties (NCP & SPLM) to negotiate a 
framework document relating to the implementation of the various outstanding 
issues. The parties committed themselves to work for the successful conduct 
of the southern Sudan referendum and pledged to respect its outcome. They 
agreed to continue negotiating the future of Abyei at the highest level; to 
hold the popular consultation in the Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan and 
respect its outcome; to demarcate immediately the North-South border; to 
maintain „soft border‟ allowing peoples movement, economic activity and 
social interaction. They accepted that decisions taken on citizenship will not 
adversely affect the rights and well-being of ordinary people. In this context, 
the two parties agreed to adopt the policy of free movement of people, goods 
and services, monetary and fiscal policy, the management of oil and water 
resources. On the question of security, the parties undertook that no one of 
them would take any action against the other or support any group that 
would undermine the security of the other. They recognized that each post-
secession state would conduct its foreign policy mindful of the need to 
achieve the objective of two viable states, which would cooperate for mutual 
benefit. The Panel was greatly encouraged by the determination of the 
parties to address the challenges ahead through peaceful negotiations. 
However, things did not go as smooth as agreed upon, especially after the 
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result of the referendum had shown that the overwhelming majority of 
Southerners wanted secession from the old Sudan.  
1. Obstacles on the way: An important change in the attitude of the 
government of Sudan came after secession had become a reality on the 9
th
 of 
July 2011; it drew harsh criticism from the northern opposition and political 
analysts to the government‟s handling of the CPA and its consequences. The 
agreement, which the government considered as its greatest achievement in 
the political history of the Sudan, turned to be its worst liability in the eyes 
of the Sudanese political elite. It resulted not only in the loss of one-third of 
the country, but also of about 40% of the government‟s annual revenue and 
almost 90% of its foreign currency that used to come from the oil extracted 
in southern Sudan. The government reacted in an emotional way by 
dismissing the southern members of parliament after the declaration of the 
result of the referendum; even workers, civil servants, soldiers and army 
officers from Southern Sudan were summarily sacked from their jobs before 
the end of the interim period. The joint integrated units were dissolved 
untimely before the 9
th
 of July, which partly contributed to the eruption of 
conflict in Southern Kordofan. Strong statements by government officials 
and media campaign against the presence of Southerners in the North 
created fear among numerous Southerners who no longer felt secure, could 
not find means of transport to the South and could not keep their jobs in the 
North. The armed forces invaded the whole of Abyei region in May 2011 
after one of their withdrawing units was attacked by the army of the South, 
despite the fact that the unit was accompanied by UN officials and using UN 
cars. It was an example of undisciplined soldiers deciding the course of 
engagement on their own, which caused real damage to the precarious 
relationship between the two countries. The flare up of conflict between 
Sudan Armed Forces and the SPLA-North in southern Kordofan in early 
June 2011, and later in September in Blue Nile was a serious development 
that worsened the relationship between the GoS and the GoSS to a new low 
level. The GoS accused GoSS by encouraging and supporting the rebellion 
in the two states. The southern army should not have been in the North long 
time ago, and the northern units in that army should have been disarmed and 
demobilized. Lack of progress on the oil issue led the GoSS to close the oil 
fields in the South in February 2012 accusing the government of Sudan by 
„stealing‟ two shipments of its oil. The government defended its action by 
saying that it did not receive any payment for its facilities and transport of 
oil since the secession on 9
th
 July; thus what it seized is what it deserves for 
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its services in the last seven months. However, the quick attack on Heglig by 
southern soldiers in the last week of March 2012, and later on 10
th
 April by 
several SPLA divisions planned on the highest military command, was the 
most serious violation of the CPA. It could have led to an outright war 
between the two countries, thanks to the international community which 
intervened quickly condemning the aggression and putting pressure on the 
GoSS to withdraw its troops, which it did. The Sudan Armed Forces felt 
humiliated, thus attacked the withdrawing army to avenge its early defeat. 
As a consequence of Heglig attack, Sudan closed its border with the South 
preventing all forms of trade and transport. The serious event led to the 
intervention of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union 
(PSCAU), on a complaint from Khartoum, which adopted, on 24
th
 of April 
2012, a comprehensive decision on the situation between the Republic of 
Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan. Later, the UN Security Council 
passed a detailed Resolution 2046 (2012) on 5
th
 May supporting the PSCAU 
decision on the matter. The Heglig event may be a blessing in disguise! 
 
2. The contents of the PSCAU decision: The Council condemns the 
violations of human rights of non-combatants, the damage of oil 
installations, the inflammatory statements from both sides and the threat of 
hostile action. It reaffirms its commitment to respect the territorial integrity 
of Sudan and South Sudan and the inviolability of their border as existed at 
the time of independence on 1 January 1956, taking into account the 
disputed areas as agreed in the deliberations of the Technical ad hoc 
Boundary Committee. It expressed deep concern at the failure of the parties 
to implement agreements that they have freely entered into, particularly the 
Temporary Arrangements for the Administration and Security of Abyei 
(20/6/2011), the Joint Political and Security Mechanism (JPSM) 
(29/6/2011), the Border Monitoring Support Mission (30/7/2011), and the 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Non-Aggression and Cooperation 
(10/2/2012). Then the Council adopted a roadmap in order to ease the 
current tension and facilitate the resumption of negotiations on post-
secession relations. It included: the immediate cessation of all hostilities 
within 48 hours; the unconditional withdrawal of all armed forces to their 
side of the border; the activation within a week of all border security 
mechanisms agreed upon; cessation of harbouring or supporting rebel groups 
against the other state; cessation of hostile propaganda and inflammatory 
statements in the media; the two governments must take full responsibility for the 
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protection of each other‟s nationals; implementation of pending aspects of Abyei 
agreement  namely the redeployment, within two weeks, of all Sudanese and 
South Sudanese forces out of Abyei; the two parties should unconditionally 
resume negotiations within two weeks under the auspices of the AUHIP, to 
reach agreement on: oil, status of nationals in the other country, border 
disputes, and status of Abyei. The negotiations should be concluded within 
three months; otherwise, the High Panel should submit a comprehensive 
report on the status of negotiations, which includes detailed proposals on all 
outstanding issues, to be endorsed as final and binding solutions to the post-
secession relations. The Council sought the endorsement of the UN Security 
Council of the same, which it did on the 5
th
 of May. The Council urged the 
Government of Sudan and the SPLM-North to reach a political negotiated 
solution on the basis of the Framework Agreement on Political Partnership 
between the NCP and SPLM-N, and Political and Security Arrangements in 
Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan states (28/6/2011). Both parties should 
extend full cooperation to the AUHIP and the Chair of IGAD to reach a 
settlement. It requested the government to permit humanitarian access to the 
affected population in the two areas. 
The two governments accepted the PSC decision and started acting upon it: 
they withdrew their armed forces from Abyei, and accepted the invitation of 
AUHIP to a meeting in Addis Ababa on 29
th
 of May to start the negotiations. 
3. Resolved issues: Some of those outstanding issues were resolved as de 
facto situation or by a common understanding after the secession on 9
th
 July: 
public service, position of the joint integrated units and property. Each 
government acted on its own right to decide the future of workers from the 
other state within its public service. The majority of those were working in 
the North, mainly in the army and police. The government sacked all of 
them, the majority got their pensions and after service claims. The joint units 
in the South and in Khartoum were easily dissolved before the end of the 
interim period; the only problem was that of the northerners from Southern 
Kordofan and Blue Nile who were part of the SPLA, and who waged a 
rebellion in the two states against the government. This problem still exists 
and shall surely be discussed in Addis Ababa negotiations as decided by the 
PSCAU and UNSC. The question of property was left to concerned 
individuals who owned plots of land or houses in the other state; most of the 
Southerners in the North sold their property in a private way while the 
Northerners in the South were not in a hurry to do that. The three issues 
were not a topic in the rounds of negotiation after secession. 
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On the currency issue, the two parties agreed before the secession to use the 
old currency in the new Republic of South Sudan for a period of six to nine 
months, and then it would be gradually exchanged in agreement between the 
two central banks of both countries. However, each country was secretly 
printing a new currency of its own before the fixed period is over. The 
Central Bank of Sudan introduced the new currency earlier than South 
Sudan, leaving the old currency in the South without value. At present, each 
country is using its own new currency, but the store of old currency in the 
South has to be compensated for in one way or another. It was an example of 
mistrust and lack of commitment on behalf of the two governments to 
honour their agreements. 
The issue of international agreements and covenants was not important; the two 
parties agreed that the predecessor state (Sudan) should continue bearing the 
entity of the old Sudan with all its international and regional agreements. 
The successor state (South Sudan) will make its own new international and 
regional treaties. 
On the assets and debts, the two parties accepted the geographical principle 
of dividing  the assets according to their location in the country where they 
exist; what is in the North will go to the North and what is in the South will 
go to the South. The foreign assets shall go to the predecessor state which 
will also bear the responsibility for the foreign debt (about 40 billion US 
dollar). It was based on the understanding that the international creditors will 
write off all possible debts; the two parties shall work together to convince 
the creditors to forgo their debts on the old Sudan. Otherwise, the parties 
shall share the debts and assets in foreign countries according to the 
recognized international standards. 
4. Partially resolved issues: Those include nationality, North-South 
border and security arrangements. 
At the beginning, the government of the North was strict about giving its 
nationality or residential concession to the hundreds of thousands of 
Southerners living in the North, while the government of the South was 
ready to do that to a far less number of Northerners in the South. The two 
parties agreed to give nine months, after secession, to the nationals of the 
other country to leave or regularize their stay according to the laws of the 
country where they want to stay. The period expired on the 8
th
 of April 2012, 
but besides some strong statements in the media the government of 
Khartoum did not attempt to enforce the decision against the over-staying 
Southerners. The government of the South never threatened to push 
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Northerners out; they were only asked to get a residential permit which is 
easily given against 100 US dollars. Eventually, a breakthrough was reached 
in the negotiations at Addis Ababa on the 13
th
 March 2012. The parties 
agreed to allow the nationals of the other state to enjoy the freedoms of 
residence, movement, economic activity, and ownership of property. A joint 
high level committee would be established to oversee the adoption and 
implementation of the agreed measures relating to the status and treatment of 
the nationals of each state in the territory of the other state. The two states 
shall negotiate an agreement to elaborate the four freedoms mentioned 
above. 
On the delimitation and demarcation of the boundary between the two states, a 
joint technical committee was established since the beginning of the interim 
period to draw the border between North and South as left by the colonial 
administration on the 1
st
 January 1956. The process should have been 
finished before the referendum of the South took place, but it dragged on till 
the secession. The joint committee agreed to about 70% of the border 
between the two countries, which consequently the presidency affirmed. 
According to the committee, only four regions were disputed: 1. Jodah or 
Dabbat al-Fukhar, a rich mechanized agricultural land between Upper Nile and 
White Nile; 2. Megenis Mountains between Upper Nile and South Kordofan; 
3. Kaka town, which lies between Upper Nile and South Kordofan, a small 
piece of land but strategically important for its access to the Nile and to oil 
producing areas; 4. Kafia Kinji, a rich area between South Darfur and 
Western Bahr al-Ghazal. The delegation of the GoSS asked JPSM by the end 
of 2010 to add a fifth area to the disputed ones, Safaha grazing area, which 
extends 14 kilometers south of Bahr al-Arab; it lies between South Darfur 
and Northern Bahr al-Ghazal. The presidency accepted the inclusion of the 
new area. In the late negotiations of 29
th
 May in Addis, the South delegation 
demanded the inclusion of five areas to the disputed regions, including 
Heglig, Abyei and almost all the oil-producing fields in the North. It came 
with a self-made map, including the claimed areas, asking that it should be 
considered as the reference map; it was immediately rejected by the 
Sudanese delegation. That was a non-starter position which practically led to 
the failure of the first round of negotiations after the SC resolution 2046. 
The High Panel tried a compromise by proposing a new map, but that was 
refused by the GoSS delegation. It seems that the South delegation was 
seeking a bargaining position against the North by increasing the number of 
disputed areas. The GoS accused the GoSS of avoiding to settle the question 
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of border before secession in order to take the whole issue to international 
arbitration, which may rule in its favour or seek a compromise settlement between 
the two countries. A complicating factor to the issue of border is that the two 
parties, like all African governments, accepted the territorial boundary as left by the 
British colonial administration on the 1
st
 January 1956, but the British left no map 
on that date to show the exact border. Moreover, the British administrators 
used to shift certain regions, for security or administrative reasons, from one 
province to another irrespective of the ethnic group living in that area. This 
happened in the cases of Abyei, Heglig, Kafia Kinji, Kaka and others. The 
GoSS claimed Abyei not on the basis of its location in January 1956 but on 
the ethnicity of its population in 1905, when it was transferred from Bahr al-
Ghazal in the South to Kordofan in the North. However, in the agreement 
between the two parties on the demarcation of boundaries in Addis Ababa 
on 13 March 2012, the parties affirmed the definition of the agreed boundary 
in accordance with the physical description and delimitation, and 
corresponding recommendations of the Technical Committee for the 1/1/1956 
border line demarcation between North and South Sudan, which was 
affirmed by the presidency of the Republic of the Sudan prior to the 
secession of southern Sudan. In the March meeting, the parties also agreed 
to establish a Joint Demarcation Committee, a Joint Technical Team, and a 
Joint Border Commission in order to finalize the question of border between 
the two countries. It is strange that in the first round of negotiations at Addis 
Ababa (17/5/2012 to 7/6/2012) the border line created much disagreement 
between the two delegations. I have the feeling that the real interest of GoSS 
is to have Abyei at any cost; thus, it might be hoping to swap the disputed 
areas for Abyei. It is worth mentioning that all the borders of the old Sudan 
with its eight neighbours have never been demarcated and most of them 
have not yet been delimited since independence till today! 
The question of security was much complicated by the fact that the SPLA 
included many units from Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, which fought 
under the leadership of Southern Sudan for many years till the signing of the 
CPA. It was not easy to terminate that comrade relationship after secession; 
the GoS accused the SPLA as still supporting and controlling the 9
th
 and 10
th
 
army divisions which started the mutiny in Southern Kordofan and Blue 
Nile. The GoSS has also its accusations against the government of Khartoum 
for supporting rebel army generals against the elected government of the 
South. In a number of previous agreements, since before secession, the 
parties promised not to threaten the security of the other state. In the 
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negotiations round of 7
th
 November 2010, facilitated by the AUHIP in 
Khartoum, the NCP and the SPLM undertook that none of them would take 
any action or support any group that would undermine the security of the 
other. Instead, the North and the South would continue to cooperate and 
share information that would enhance their capacity to deal with internal and 
external threats as well as trans-border crime. The MoU between the two 
parties reached on 10 February 2012 on non-aggression and cooperation 
affirmed similar statements. It clearly said that neither country will harbour, 
arm or train militia or other entities against the other. This is why the 
PSCAU, in its decision on 24
th
 April 2012, expressed its deep concern at the 
failure of the parties to implement agreements that they themselves have 
freely entered into. It seems that the real problem is not to find the 
theoretical solution for this or that issue; it is the political will to implement 
in an honest and serious manner what the parties have agreed upon. That is a 
question of political culture rather than a legal position towards a certain 
issue. It is understandable that the GoS, being threatened in the regions of 
Darfur, Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile and the border with the South, to 
insist on first discussing the issue of security arrangements in the last Addis 
Ababa round. It was agreed that each army should withdraw 10 km from the 
border within its territory; the step has not been implemented because the 
borderline between the two countries was not agreed upon. 
6. Unresolved issues: Those include: popular consultation, Abyei status, 
oil and water. 
The issue of popular consultation in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile was 
part of the CPA; the people of the two states are supposed to give their 
opinion on the status granted to them in the CPA and how it was 
implemented during the interim period. The consultation in Southern 
Kordofan never took place because the state election was delayed till May 
2011, then the armed conflict started immediately in the next month. In the 
Blue Nile, the process started but was not completed because the state joined 
the conflict of Southern Kordofan in September of the same year. An attempt 
was made to solve the conflict peacefully by the Framework Agreement on 
Political Partnership between NCP and SPLM-N signed by the leaders of the 
two parties, Nafi A. Nafi and Malik Agar, in Addis Ababa on 28
th
 June 
2011. However, the leadership of the NCP was quick to reject the agreement 
allowing the conflict to drag on till today. The other side sought to broaden 
the rebellion against the government by allying itself with another militia 
group „the Justice and Equity Movement‟ of Darfur under the name of 
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Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF). The aim of the new organization is to 
overthrow the NCP government by political and military means. The 
decision of the PSCAU asked GoS and SPLM-N, in cooperation with 
AUHIP and the Chair of IGAD, to reach a negotiated settlement for the two 
states on the basis of the Framework Agreement mentioned before. The 
issue of popular consultation became entangled with the questions of peace, 
security, the North-South border, and the wider issue of good governance in 
all the Sudan. 
The Abyei status remains to be the most difficult and complicated issue, even 
reaching a temporary arrangement and implementing it proved to be not 
possible. The inclusion of Abyei in the CPA was against the principle of the 
border according to the January 1956 status; the American senator John 
Danforth played an important role in trying to solve the impasse between the 
two parties by authoring the problematic and vague protocol of Abyei as it 
exists. The first dispute between the two parties was about the area of Abyei, 
which they took after much wrangling to the PCA in The Hague; the second 
was about the person who is eligible to vote in the referendum to decide the 
future of Abyei, whether to remain in the North or join the South as SPLM 
wants. The SPLM defended the right of Dinka Ngok, being the original 
residents of the region, to decide its future; the NCP argued that the protocol 
defined the residents of Abyei Area as: “the members of Ngok Dinka 
community and other Sudanese residing in the area”, and that allows the 
Misseriya nomads who live up to 8 months in the region to take part in the 
voting. That was unacceptable to the SPLM, because it simply means that 
the Misseriya, who are the majority in the area will surely keep it in the 
North. A number of proposals to solve the problem were advanced by the 
American envoy and AUHIP, but none of them got the approval of both 
parties. Two serious clashes took place in Abyei between SAF and SPLA 
which led to the displacement of the majority of its population. The PSCAU 
in its late decision asked for the implementation of the Agreement on 
Temporary Security and Administrative Arrangements for the Abyei Area, in 
particular the redeployment of all Sudanese and South Sudanese forces out of 
Abyei. The local administration will be formed from the two communities in the 
region under the protection and supervision of the Ethiopian force introduced by 
the United Nations (UNISFA). 
 
The issue of oil in the South and the service facilities being in the North 
should have been a factor to encourage both poor countries for closer economic and 
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interdependence relationship. The opposite happened; it became a dividing 
factor because of the extreme demands proposed by each party that 
eventually led to the closure of the oil fields in the South pushing the two 
governments to go around begging for foreign financial loans or assistance. 
A number of proposals were put forward by the AUHIP to bridge the gap 
between the exaggerated demand of GoS for its oil facilities and services 
and the poor offer given by GoSS; none of them was accepted by both 
parties. It seems that each side wants to break the other thinking that it cannot 
stand the pressure of deprivation for long. However, the deadlock cannot continue 
for a long time because both governments are in desperate economic position. 
The World Bank analysis of the economic and social impact of the shutdown 
of oil in the South (March 2012) gives a bleak picture for the economic 
situation and its repercussions in South Sudan. 
The question of water is puzzling; it is mentioned in the Southern Sudan 
Referendum Act as one of the outstanding issues to be negotiated by the two 
parties. It has never come up in any of the many rounds of negotiations 
between the GoS and GoSS since July 2010. It is GoSS which holds the 
leverage on the question of water, because it is not in need of water at 
present but it has a legal right to divide with the Sudan its share in the Nile 
water which amounts to 18.5 bqm. It is likely that the government of the 
South wants to keep this card under its sleeve to use it at the right moment. 
The Sudan can hardly afford sharing this amount of water with the South, 
unless new sources of water are developed like the Jonglei canal. 
The Way to Peace: 
It is not in the interest of either party to go to an outright war because of 
failure in resolving the outstanding issues; none of them is ready for that 
eventuality from a military, economic or political point of view. They 
showed in a number of cases that they do not wish to go to a full-fledged 
war in the cases of Abyei, Southern Kordofan and Heglig. They may be 
aware, by now, that none of them could win by military means to defeat the 
other and force him to deliver what he wants. That does not mean they 
would not continue their political brinkmanship, which may plunge them 
into small scale conflicts. As pragmatists and self-centred politicians, the NCP 
and SPLM leaders know where to stop the game before it endangered their 
fragile regimes. In order to follow the way to peace, the two sides have to 
broaden their vision for a long term strategic relationship because it is to 
their mutual benefit to do so. The negotiations on the outstanding issues 
should be based on that strategic outlook. The world community should help 
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them to adopt such a broad and long term vision. Despite the obvious 
differences between the two countries, which partly led to the painful 
secession, there are many common features between the people of the two 
countries which make them closer to each other than to the Africans in the 
South or the Arabs in the North. Besides the social and cultural linkages, the 
two countries have vital areas of common interest: oil, Nile waters, long 
tradition of cross-border trade and cattle grazing, and rich agricultural land 
along the border. The systems of education, civil service, judiciary, military, 
police, medical care etc.. are similar; the new-born country in the South may 
benefit from the experience and technocrats in the North in all these areas 
better than expatriates from other countries. Strange enough, the two parties 
recognize this common interest, which they mentioned in a number of their 
agreements, but when they disagree on something they completely forget 
about it and behave like enemies. It may be for internal politics, each party 
needs a „common enemy‟ in order to galvanize popular support behind its 
ill-confidant government! 
The resolutions of both PSCAU and UNSC under Chapter 7 will put a 
tremendous pressure on both governments to behave themselves and reach 
agreements on time. It is unlikely that any of them would dare to oppose the 
two august bodies headlong; the quick withdrawal from Heglig and the 
beginning of negotiations on time in Addis Ababa prove this assumption. 
The AUHIP, as usual, was quick to take the lead and facilitate the 
negotiations between the two parties in Addis Ababa. This time it is armed 
with a comprehensive and detailed resolution from the PSCAU and UNSC under 
Chapter 7, which threatens “any or all of the parties have not complied with 
the decisions set forth in this resolution, to take appropriate additional measures 
under Article 41 of the Charter as necessary”. The Sudan, before the voting on the 
resolution, was hesitant to accept it, but after consulting with the Russian 
government found out that it would get no support in case it refuses the 
resolution. The resolution was passed by consensus in the UNSC. In order to 
prevent prolonging the process, the resolution gave fixed dates for the various 
actions which are supposed to be implemented by the two parties, including 
the conclusion of the negotiations on all issues within three months. In the 
event these negotiations fail to result in an agreement, it asked the Secretary 
General in consultation with the AUHIP, the Chair of IGAD, and the 
Chairman of AU Commission to report within four months of the resolution, 
including detailed proposals on all outstanding issues. That means, the 
UNSC is considering enforcing its own solutions for the problem of Sudan 
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and South Sudan. It may be a good idea for the AUHIP to involve in the 
coming rounds of negotiations some political forces other than the two 
ruling parties, some active civil society organizations and neutral experts. One of 
the obvious shortcomings of the CPA, it was a closed club for the NCP and 
the SPLM, and whenever they disagreed on something they had to take it to 
a third party outside the country. Surely the big powers have other concerns 
and problems to care about than stick themselves to the North-South endless 
conflict. Involving other Sudanese and South Sudanese would broaden the 
popular base of the agreement; give a better guarantee to the fulfillment of 
what agreed upon; and assuring each party that its political rivals would not 
exploit the unpopular parts of the agreement against it. The approach to 
negotiate the issues should be in the form of a package deal rather than on 
single issue basis. It is not necessary that all outstanding issues should be 
solved at once; some of the sensitive and complicated ones, like Abyei status 
or the disputed areas, may be postponed to a fixed time in the future. Both 
parties should be given tangible incentives by the world community on the 
conclusion of a peaceful settlement. The fixed dates given in the SC resolution 
should not be taken literally as long as positive progress is achieved. 
However, without real change in the spirit and political will of the two 
parties, it is not likely that they will reach a comprehensive settlement on the 
various outstanding issues. The world community may use the present 
economic crisis in both countries to press for a change of attitude, on a firm 
commitment that it will help them solving their economic difficulties. The world 
community may go a step further to encourage and support all forms of 
economic cooperation between the two quarreling states. In the past, the 
financial promises of the world community to the parties have not been 
honoured; it is time that the world community shows something in advance.  
The Conclusion 
The problem of North-South Sudan is not unique in Africa but it is more 
complicated by internal and external factors, and a long history of confrontation. The 
eventual peaceful solution in Sudan will be an example for others as 
happened in the case of South Africa; if not it will have disastrous consequences 
for most of its neighbours. The two parties alone cannot easily solve their 
problems, as it was demonstrated since the beginning of negotiations on the 
CPA. The international community has to be actively involved, but it has to 
act in a fair and neutral way in order to achieve sustainable peace and 
cooperation between the two new countries. The African Union and the 
AUHIP are the best bodies to facilitate and lead the negotiation process till it 
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successfully concludes the desired settlement. There is a strong suspicion 
within the NCP, shared by the majority of Northerners that the big western 
powers are pro-South and against the North; the charge can easily be used to 
mobilize people against western proposed solutions. The western 
governments should be more sensitive to such accusations in dealing with 
North-South relations. The economic crisis in the two countries is an 
opportunity for the west to attract the two parties for positive cooperation, in 
return for economic incentives. It may be a good idea to use close 
neighbours, like Saudi Arabia and Egypt, to influence Sudan; Kenya and 
Uganda, to persuade South Sudan. The resolutions of the PSCAU and UNSC 
should be used to the maximum in order to reach a fair and peaceful settlement 
to all outstanding issues between the two obstinate countries. 
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